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The recent dispute between the United States and the European Union over a
Massachusetts procurement statute that, in essence, imposed a 10% negative
preference against companies active in Burma involved a combination of two of
the worst irritants in U.S.-EU economic relations.
1 First, the Massachusetts law
involves action by sub-federal governments in the United States in possible
contravention of international obligations. It was the EU that insisted during the
Uruguay Round negotiations concluded in 1994 that GATT Article XXIV(12),
the so-called federal state clause, and analogous clauses in other major WTO
agreements, be clarified in a manner that makes crystal clear that federal states
are fully responsible for the actions of their component units.
2 The EU’s member
states, most of which are unitary states, have long been concerned with the
possible imbalance in trade agreement obligations that can be created if federal
state clauses are drafted and interpreted to excuse federal state’s from
responsibility for actions by their sub-federal governments.
3 Moreover, state
procurement policies affecting market access by EU companies have historically
concerned the EU as evidenced by their continual citation in the annual trade
barrier reports issued by the EU Commission. However, the EU frustration with
sub-federal behavior in the United States is not limited to the trade arena. For
instance, Germany continued to pursue a case before the World Court against
the United States because Arizona did not notify a German national, charged
with murder, of his right to meet with a consular official, even though the
German national had already been executed.
4 Indeed, many European countries
view the imposition of the death penalty by U.S. states, irrespective of the
nationality of the convict and consular notification issues, as a violation of
international human rights norms.
Second, the Massachusetts statute had an extraterritorial regulatory effect.
Similar to a secondary boycott, the Massachusetts statute sought to influence the
dealings of foreign companies (as well as U.S. companies) with Burma.
Extraterritorial application of laws by the United States has created friction with
European countries at least since the 1960’s.
5 These frictions are particularly
notable in (but not exclusive to) the area of economic sanctions for foreign
policy goals, such as the so-called Soviet Pipeline controversy in the mid-
1980’s, and the more recent example of the Helms-Burton Act seeking to
penalize economic dealings with Cuba.
6
The Massachusetts law was challenged in the WTO by the EU and in U.S.
domestic courts by the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), an association
first created in 1914, and now including over 580 multinational corporations as
members.
7 NFTC members include most of the largest U.S. manufacturers and
banks and account for 70% of U.S. non-agricultural exports.
8 The WTO case4
never reached an examination of the Massachusetts law by a dispute settlement
panel. Instead, the law was held unconstitutional at all three levels of the U.S.
federal court system: the federal district court,
9 the federal appeals court,
10 and
the U.S. Supreme Court.
11 Yet, it is unclear what impact the Supreme Court’s
decision will have on future state and local sanctions efforts because many
groups are reading the opinion quite narrowly. Thus, future disputes over similar
measures can by no means be ruled out. This begs the question of what can be
done to avoid similar disputes, or what is the best way to resolve similar
disputes, if they cannot be avoided. Fortunately, the dispute over the
Massachusetts Burma law points the way towards several methods for
preventing and resolving future disputes between the EU and the US over not
only state procurement sanctions laws enacted for foreign policy reasons but
state and local laws more generally.
Part I of this paper briefly examines the human rights situation in Burma
that prompted not only Massachusetts but also the U.S. federal government and
the EU to impose sanctions. Part II gives statistics regarding foreign investment
in Burma as of 1998 when the EU-US dispute over the Massachusetts Burma
law reached its peak. Part III describes the process by which Massachusetts
became bound to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Part IV
explains the history and nature of sanctions imposed against Burma by the U.S.
federal government, the EU, and the state of Massachusetts. Part V explains the
rationale behind the diplomatic and procedural maneuvers in the EU’s WTO
case and also analyzes the substantive claims of the EU under the GPA. Part VI
analyzes the motivations and procedures regarding the NFTC’s domestic court
challenge to the Massachusetts Burma law. It proceeds to examine the
constitutional claims the NFTC based its suit upon and the results in U.S. courts.
Part VII looks at the future of state procurement sanctions laws enacted for
foreign policy reasons in light of the U.S. court rulings. Part VIII explores the
implications of the Massachusetts Burma law dispute for EU-US dispute
prevention and resolution and gives several recommendations regarding state
foreign policy-related procurement sanctions laws. These recommendations for
dispute prevention and settlement carry over to other forms (i.e. non-
procurement manifestations) of state foreign policy-related sanction laws.
Finally, this part turns to look at protectionist motivated state legislation, finding
that the recommendations for dispute prevention remain the same in this context,
but the recommendations for dispute resolution change.
I. BURMA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD
Burma, a country of nearly 42 million people, gained independence in 1948.
12 It
was ruled by a democratically elected civilian government until a military coup
d’etat in 1962.
13 The military leadership has prevented the reinstitution of5
democracy through the intimidation, arrest, and killing of persons in the pro-
democracy movement throughout the last four decades. In 1988, massive
democracy demonstrations were held but this resulted in the arrest of the leaders
of the movement and the killing of over 3,000 civilians by the military.
14 The
military regime promised and held elections in May 1990.
15 However, the
military regime feared losing the elections and placed soon-to-be Nobel Peace
Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of National League for
Democracy (NLD), under house arrest nine months prior to the elections.
16 The
NLD won 392 out of 474 seats in the Parliament (with the military party
winning only eleven seats) but the military regime rejected the results.
17
Throughout the 1990’s, the military continued to detain NLD members to
prevent them from organizing and attending party conventions, including several
large scale detentions in 1996 and 1997. Burma also has grave problems relating
to forced labor.
18 It is estimated that as many as 800,000 persons may be
involved in coerced labor in Burma, producing as much as 10% of its gross
domestic product.
19
II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BURMA
In 1998, the year the EU asked for establishment of a WTO panel on the
Massachusetts Burma law and the year the NFTC challenged the law in U.S.
federal court, the United States was among the top five countries in terms of
foreign investment in Burma.
20 Two EU member states, the United Kingdom
and France, were the two largest foreign investors.
21 Oil and gas companies are
the largest foreign investors in Burma, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all
foreign investment in Burma since 1988.
22 Without any government action,
pressure by stakeholders, including human rights organizations, led several
major companies, including Pepsi, to withdraw from Burma prior to 1998.
III. BINDING MASSACHUSETTS AND OTHER STATES TO THE
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT
The original GATT 1947 largely exempted government procurement practices
from its major non-discrimination obligations of national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment.
23 During the Tokyo Round negotiations of the 1970’s
that addressed non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for the first time in a significant
manner in the GATT system, a Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
was negotiated in an effort to curb protectionist procurement policies. Like the
other NTB “codes” concluded during the Tokyo Round, ratification of the GPA
was done on an a la carte basis.
24 Only a select group of industrialized countries
elected to join the GPA in 1979. The agreement did not cover the procurement
practices of sub-national governments.6
When the EU and the United States sought to expand coverage of the agreement
during the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the EU made clear that
coverage of U.S. state-level procurement was a priority matter.
25 The U.S.
federal government originally contemplated binding all states to the renegotiated
GPA. However, in response to political (not constitutional) limitations, the
federal government elected for a more flexible approach in which it would bind
only those states whose governors submitted a voluntary “letter of commitment”
agreeing to be bound. The “letters of commitment” could limit the state agencies
bound or carve out exceptions for certain goods or services and these were
included in the annex to the GPA elaborating state coverage. The Governor of
Massachusetts at the time, Bill Weld, was one of thirty-seven state governors
that submitted a letter of commitment to the United States Trade Representative
agreeing to be bound to the GPA. The degree to which a particular state’s
legislature was involved in the process depended largely on inter-branch
cooperation in the state. However, the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), a D.C.-based organization, was informed of and apprised of the
negotiations.
In order to determine whether a particular state-level procurement is
covered under the GPA, a five-part analysis must be undertaken. First, the state
must be listed in the U.S. schedule annexed to the agreement. Second, the
particular state agency undertaking the procurement must be listed under the
state’s name. Third, the contract must exceed the thresholds established by the
agreement for state-level procurement, roughly $500,000 for goods and services,
and $6.5 million for construction. Fourth, the particular good or service being
procured must not be exempted from coverage. For instance, pre-existing
preferences for domestic autos, steel and coal were exempted for all states
covered. Additionally, individual states exempted other products of particular
sensitivity, such as beef for South Dakota or boats for Washington. Fifth, other
general exemptions must not apply, such as those for small and minority
business set-asides. No state commitment forced a change in current state law,
perhaps one reason why state legislatures were not involved to a significant
degree by governors in the crafting of the letters of commitment. As a result, the
GPA creates essentially a standstill obligation against new protectionist
legislation by the states for covered procurements.
26 However, the coverage of
37 states to this degree under the agreement allowed the U.S. to gain coverage of
EU sub-national governments and EU heavy electrical and telecommunications
procurements to a degree. The GPA entered into force on January 1, 1996. The
agreement was an exception to the largely “single package” approach to
ratification of the Uruguay Round agreements.
27 The a la carte approach to
ratification led to only 23 countries becoming party to the agreement.7
There is no exception in the agreement for foreign policy-related
procurement sanctions statutes at the state-level. No state asked for such an
exception (and the federal government almost certainly would not have
negotiated one even if a state did make such a request). Indeed, at the time states
were not focused on foreign policy sanctions laws in the procurement area
because South Africa sanctions laws were eliminated several years earlier with
the ending of apartheid and the transition to democracy in South Africa.
IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA PRIOR TO THE EU-US DISPUTE
A. U.S. Federal Sanctions Against Burma
The United States government cut off direct financial assistance to Burma as
early as 1988.
28 In July 1989, in response to the house arrest of Suu Kyi, the
U.S. government suspended tariff preferences under the Generalized System of
Preferences.
29 The United States government followed these measures with an
arms embargo, downgrading its representation in Burma from an Ambassador to
Charges D’Affairs, and imposing visa restrictions on senior Burmese officials.
30
In response to crackdowns against the pro-democracy movement, the U.S.
Congress imposed additional sanctions in September 1996. The 1996 federal
law
31 continued the ban on bilateral assistance, directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors of the international financial
institutions to oppose any loans to Burma, banned visas for Burmese
government officials, and authorized the President to ban new investments in
Burma if the Burmese government re-arrested Suu Kyi or committed large scale
repression or violence against the Democratic opposition. In April of 1997,
President Clinton announced his intention to impose a ban on new investment.
Subsequently, on May 20,
 1997, an Executive Order was issued making the ban
on new investment.
32 The ban applied to all U.S. persons. The Executive Order
specifically exempted the sale of goods to Burma and non-profit activities. The
Executive Order was issued not only pursuant to the federal Burma sanctions
law but also the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA).
33
IEEPA is a framework law delegating authority to the Executive to impose
economic sanctions in response to “any unusual and extraordinary threat … to
the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”
34 Several
U.S. multinational corporations voiced criticism of the sanctions, including
United Technologies and Unocal.
Over the past several years, pressure has been brought to bear on both the
Clinton Administration and subsequently the Bush Administration to impose
additional sanctions on Burma. Much of this pressure arises from a November
2000 International Labor Organization (ILO) recommendation under Article 338
of the organization’s charter, unprecedented in the 81 year history of the
organization, calling on members of the ILO to review their relations with
Burma and ensure that the Burmese government cannot take advantage of such
relations to perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labor.
35
B. EU Sanctions Against Burma
The EU also took action in 1996 to sanction Burma. Specifically, the EU
expelled Burmese military personnel, banned the export of all armaments and
military equipment to Burma, suspended financial assistance other than
humanitarian, and banned visas for high ranking Burmese officials and their
families.
36 In March 1997, the EU suspended tariff preferences for Burmese
agricultural products and five months later extended the suspension to cover
industrial products.
37
C. Massachusetts (and other sub-national government) Sanctions Against
Burma
On June 25
th, 1996, three months prior to the passage of the federal Burma
sanctions law and six months after entry into force of the GPA, Massachusetts
Governor Weld, surrounded by Burmese activists, signed a law instituting
procurement sanctions against companies active in Burma. Governor Weld, in
the midst of a U.S. Senate race at the time and originally against the legislation,
was reportedly influenced somewhat by the fact that his opponent John Kerrey
had been slow to endorse the idea of sanctions against Burma. Aggressive
lobbying by human rights activists and NGOs and the lack of any significant
opposition by the business community at the time also apparently helped change
Governor Weld’s mind.
The principal sponsor in the Massachusetts legislature was Byron
Rushing. Representative Rushing was inspired in part by a 1993 talk by
Desmond Tutu indicating the effectiveness of sanctions in changing the policies
of the South African government. He was also lobbied by Simon Billenness, an
analyst for an asset management firm specializing in socially responsible
investments and a prominent figure in the Free Burma Coalition, a coalition of
NGOs including the Massachusetts Burma Roundtable, promoting action against
Burma.
38 The Free Burma Coalition used an internet and e-mail campaing very
successfully to push for boycott of products of companies active in Burma (such
as campus boycotts of Pepsi products) and to place pressure on governments to
impose sanctions.
39 Their website was established with the support of the Sorros
Foundation and the Open Society Institute.
40 Representative Rushing and
Billenness originally met at a conference marking the end to the boycott of
companies doing business in South Africa.
41 It was there that Billenness first9
suggested to Rushing the possibility of a new target: Burma.
42 After
familiarizing himself with the situation in Burma, Rushing pulled the bill
Massachusetts’ legislature drafted a decade earlier regarding South Africa,
struck the words South Africa from the bill, replaced them with the word
Burma, and introduced the bill.
43 The state of Massachusetts, and indeed the
groups pushing for the sanctions, does not have a large ethnic Burmese or
Burmese-American contingents.
44 The Massachusetts Burma law was not an
instance in which a particular ethnic group influences foreign policy legislation.
Representative Rushing was not even aware at the time of drafting the bill
that Massachusetts was bound to the GPA. After learning of the GPA, Rushing
was quoted as referring to the agreement as the “Government Procurement blah
blah.”
45 Rushing claimed the “identifiable goal (of the law) is free democratic
elections in Burma.”
46 Upon signing the bill into law, Governor Weld called
upon other states and the U.S. Congress to “follow (Massachusetts) example and
make a stand for the cause of freedom.”
47 While the bill passed by a handy
margin, some in the Massachusetts legislature did criticize the bill as an effort
by the state to engage in “its own little version of foreign policy” and that the
legislature should instead “focus its efforts on creating jobs here at home and not
try to dabble in foreign affairs.”
48
The statute required the Secretary of the Massachusetts’ Department of
Finance and Purchasing to maintain a “restricted list” of all companies “doing
business” in Burma.
49 Companies on the list were given the opportunity to rebut
the information. In preparing the list, the Secretary was to rely on information
from the United Nations and non-governmental human rights organizations. The
statute prohibited the state from procuring from entities on the restricted list but
made exceptions in cases in which the procurement was essential, for certain
medical supplies, and when there was no “comparable low bid or offer.”
50 The
statute defined “comparable bid” as on offer equal to or less than 10% above the
low bid from a company on the restricted purchase list.
51 Therefore, the statute
did not act as an outright ban on all purchases from companies on the restricted
list, but rather operated to impose a 10% negative preference against companies
on the restricted list.
V. THE EU’S WTO CASE
A. Diplomacy and Procedures
The EU first formally protested the Massachusetts measure in a demarche to the
State Department in January 1997. A month later, the EU complained of the
Massachusetts law at a WTO Government Procurement Committee meeting.
52
In June of 1997, the EU formally requested consultation under the WTO Dispute10
Settlement Understanding.
53 However, Massachusetts found an ally in the form
of the European Parliament. The EU parliament condemned the Commission’s
decision to bring a WTO case and urged the EU to impose more stringent
sanctions against Burma.
54
Japan joined the WTO consultations a month later.
55 Several trilateral
consultations were held over the course of the next year. The EU also sought to
make an overture directly to Representative Rushing.
56 This was initially done
through the UK consul in Boston. However, the EU sought and obtained
approval from the State Department to consult directly with Rushing. EU
officials together with the UK consul met with Rushing. At the meeting, the EU
offered to drop their WTO complaint if Massachusetts amended their measure
so as to exempt WTO-covered procurements, i.e., procurements above the
threshold of $500,000 for goods and services. However, Representative Rushing
asked what additional measures the EU would take to place pressure on the
Burmese regime. The EU took a pass on this conversation seeking to avoid a
situation in which it might have to negotiate state-by-state as states considered
and adopted sanctions measures of this type. Moreover, Rushing ultimately
became unwilling to consider amendment of the measure because of a domestic
court challenge to the measure lodged by the National Foreign Trade Council.
While amending the law to apply only to contracts below the GPA threshold
would have eliminated the possibility of the WTO challenge, it would not have
protected Massachusetts from challenge on domestic constitutional grounds.
The issue of extraterritorial sanctions also was a key issue of discussion at
the May 1998 EU-US Summit. In addition to an agreement specifically relating
to the Helms-Burton law, the EU and US arrived at a general agreement, albeit
in a non-binding political commitment, on the extraterritorial application of
foreign policy-related sanctions. Specifically, they agreed to “not seek or
propose, and (to) resist, the passage of new economic sanctions legislation based
on foreign policy grounds which is designed to make economic operators of the
other behave in a manner similar to that required of its own operators” and that
sanctions would be targeted “directly and specifically against those responsible
for the problem.”
57 Given the EU’s concern with the Massachusetts Burma law
it is unsurprising that the declaration also included a statement regarding state
and local sanctions. Specifically, the document stated that “the policies of
governmental bodies at other levels should be consonant with (the principles
applicable to federal government sanctions) and avoid sending conflicting
messages to countries engaged in unacceptable behavior.”
58
In August 1998, Ambassador Barshefsky announced her intention to
defend the Massachusetts law in any WTO panel proceeding.
59 A coalition of
labor unions, religious groups and non-profits had lobbied the Administration to11
defend the law. The potential challenge to the Massachusetts law also created a
stir in Congress. Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) introduced a bill in August that
would have barred the U.S. Department of Justice from using funds to challenge
state laws inconsistent with trade agreements. The implementing bill of the
Uruguay Round, similar to many previous trade agreement implementing bill,
prohibits private parties from suing states based on trade agreements but allows
the federal Executive Branch to do so.
60 The implementing bill also declares that
any dispute settlement panel report shall not be considered as binding nor
otherwise accorded deference in such a proceeding.
61 Instead, the court will
consider the matter de novo. The Kucinich bill would have effectively
eliminated the one avenue for ultimately forcing state compliance and thus
undermined U.S. Executive credibility at the negotiating table when dealing
with state measures. The Kucinich bill was defeated by a margin of 228-200.
62
In September of 1998, the EU together with Japan requested
establishment of a dispute settlement panel.
63 The motivation for elevating the
dispute was not only Massachusetts’ ultimate unwillingness to amend the
measure, but at least equally important, the proliferation of measures at the local
level, including some consideration by Massachusetts to extend its measure to
companies active in Indonesia.
64 A Commission spokesperson described the
request for a panel as a “shot across the bow.”
65 In recent decades, state and
local sanction measures were enacted in surges. In the mid-1970’s, thirteen
states enacted laws sanctioning companies trading with Arab countries that
imposed a boycott on Israel. In the 1980’s, more than 30 states enacted sanctions
against companies active in South Africa. In fact, Massachusetts was the first
state to impose sanctions against South Africa.
The city of Berkeley, California became the first sub-national government
to sanction companies active in Burma.
66 While Massachusetts was the only
state to follow suit, twenty-two other cities, including New York City and Los
Angeles also passed ordinances affecting procurement from companies active in
Burma.
67 NGOs circulated the Massachusetts legislation to legislators in other
states and cities and lobbied for its passage. At the time of the WTO challenge,
state and city governments were considering or already passed measures
imposing sanctions seeking to punish other countries’ behavior, including not
only Indonesia but also Nigeria, Switzerland and China.
68 Ironically, this
proliferation of state and local sanctions measures was occurring at the same
time that the Congress and Executive Branch were engaged in serious
discussions over reforming the use of sanctions.
69 Key elements in these
discussions were the desirability of conducting cost-benefit analysis, including
consideration of the effectiveness of sanctions, granting the president “waiver”
authority, automatic “sunset” provisions, and strongly encouraging attempts to
multilateralize sanctions prior to imposing unilateral sanctions.12
The WTO approved establishment of the panel in November 1998.
70
However, in accordance with WTO dispute settlement rules, the EU and Japan
suspended their WTO claim in February 1999 because a U.S. district court
invalidated the Massachusetts measure on U.S. constitutional grounds in
November of 1998.
71 While the EU made clear it would re-open the WTO case
if the district court ruling was reversed on appeal, invalidation of the
Massachusetts law was upheld by the First Circuit Court of Appeals and
ultimately by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the parties to the WTO case
never issued formal briefs nor did a panel rule on the consistency of the
Massachusetts measure with the GPA. It is nevertheless possible to examine,
based on public statements and writings, some of the arguments that would have
been made by the two sides in the case.
B. Substantive Claims
1. Violation Claims
The EU’s first violation claim is based on GPA Article VIII(b) that deals with
conditions for qualifying suppliers.
72 It states that “qualification procedures shall
be consistent with the following: …(b) any conditions for participation in
tendering procedures shall be limited to those which are essential to ensure the
firm’s capability to fulfil the contract in question.” The EU argument must be
that the activity in Burma has nothing to do with a firm’s capability to fulfill a
contract in Massachusetts. Massachusetts rebuttal is that the Article VIIII only
applies to pre-qualifying bidders for selective tender procedures and that a 10%
negative preference statute is not relevant to pre-qualifying bidders.
73
Additionally, the examples given of conditions that can be imposed, such as a
bid bond requirement, only relate to the right to bid and not to the “actual factors
that (one) looks at to decide who gets” the contract.
74
The second violation claim of the EU concerned Article XIII(4)(b).
Article XIII(4) is titled “Award of Contracts.” It requires the procuring entity to
make “the award to the tenderer who has been determined to be fully capable of
undertaking the contract and whose tender, whether for domestic products or
services, or products or services of other Parties, is either the lowest tender or
the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the
notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most advantageous.”
The critical question is whether the evaluation criteria can only be related to cost
and quality factors or can relate to non-economic political factors.
75
The final violation claim is based on the national treatment obligation
found in GPA Article III. It provides that with respect to procurement laws, each
covered entity “shall provide immediately and unconditionally to the products13
and services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services of the
Parties, treatment no less favorable than (a) that accorded to domestic products,
services, and suppliers….” The EU’s argument under this article is hampered by
the fact that, unlike GATT and GATS national treatment obligations, the GPA
obligation does not contain the langage of “like” products, services and
suppliers. The “likeness” criteria has been interpreted by GATT panel’s to
preclude consideration of factors unrelated to the product itself in determining
whether two products are like. For instance, if two products are similar in
natural properties and qualities, end uses and consumer tastes, they will be found
like even if they are made by dissimilar processes. With the language “like”
suppliers, the EU could argue by analogy that an EU supplier involved in Burma
should not be discriminated against versus a US supplier not involved in Burma
since a suppliers dealings with a third country do not make the suppliers unlike.
Even without the language “like”, however, the EU could make the same
argument. Massachusetts response is that EU suppliers are treated equally with
U.S. suppliers.
76 If the supplier is active in Burma, a negative preference is
imposed regardless of origin of the supplier. In other words, Massachusetts
claims the relevant comparison is not between treatment afforded an EU
company active in Burma and a US company not active in Burma but rather
between an EU company active in Burma and a US company active in Burma.
The GPA Article III continues that each covered procuring entity “shall
not treat a locally-established supplier less favorably than another locally-
established supplier on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership.”
The EU might additionally argue that the Massachusetts law potentially
discriminates against a U.S company, for example, on the basis that it is owned
by a European company with investments in Burma.
2. The Realpolitik of WTO Dispute Settlement
While Massachusetts may have colorable textual arguments, at least with respect
to some of the EU’s claims, and the WTO Appellate Body and panels, consistent
with the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, place primary emphasis on
the textual method of interpretation, it is undeniable that “shared community
expectations” come into play behind the face of opinions.
77 WTO panels have
been traditionally and historically hostile to extraterritorial regulations (or those
measures seeking to have extraterritorial effect).
78 While recent interpretations
of exceptions to GATT allow some leeway in extraterritorial protection of the
environment,
79 the realpolitik of WTO dispute settlement probably means there
is a good chance that a panel would find a Massachusetts-type measure
inconsistent with the GPA. Indeed, former USTR Ambassador Yeuter predicted
in strong terms that a WTO panel would rule against the Massachusetts measure
were they ever to examine its consistency with the GPA.
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3. Non-Violation Nullification and Impairment Claim
Just as the GATT does, the GPA allows for the possiblity that a successful claim
can be brought against a measure, that while not a violation of the GPA, nullifies
and impairs benefits a party expected to accrue under the agreement.
81 These so-
called non-violation nullification and impairment cases have been very rare
under the GATT.
82 The test established by GATT panels is whether the party
could reasonably have anticipated such a measure being instituted subsequent to
the tariff concession. In this case, the question is whether the EU could
reasonably have anticipated a measure that limits the access of EU suppliers to
the Massachusetts procurement market, subsequent to the binding of
Massachusetts to the GPA. Massachusetts might argue that it, along with many
other states, enacted such legislation less than a decade earlier with respect to
South Africa. Thus, the EU could reasonably have anticipated future human
rights violations and moral concerns of state citizens rising to such a level as to
lead to the enactment of such measures again. However, again, realpolitik
suggests that a WTO panel may be sympathetic to the plight of the EU.
VI. U.S. DOMESTIC COURT CASE
A. Motivations and Procedures
In April 1998, the National Foreign Trade Council filed its complaint against the
constitutional validity of the Massachusetts law in U.S. district court. Many
other prior state foreign policy-related sanctions laws were not challenged by
businesses for fear of a public backlash or consumer boycott of the company
bringing such a suit.
83 With the NFTC filing suit, and the organization’s name
on the court papers, the risks of a backlash against an individual company were
minimized.
84 Additionally, by acting in concert businesses were able to spread
the costs of litigation.
85 As of April 1998, 44 U.S. companies and over 300
foreign companies were listed on the restricted purchase list maintain by the
Massachusetts Department of Administration and Finance.
86 Thirty-four
members of the NFTC were on the restricted list, including Atlantic Richfield,
Federal Express, Procter and Gamble, Unocal and Halliburton.
87 The NFTC
claimed that at least 3 companies severed ties with Burma in response to the
Massachusetts law but many more did not and thus faced potential procurement
sanctions.
88 Among the companies withdrawing from Burma, at least in part due
to the Massachusetts law and consideration by other states of similar laws, were
Apple Computer, Phillips Electronics, Hewlett-Packard, and Eastman Kodak.
The possibility of a WTO dispute settlement panel examining the measure
under the GPA or the possibility of Massachusetts amending their law so as to
only apply to non-GPA covered contracts did not dissuade the NFTC from15
bringing the challenge. First, even if the EU were successful in bringing a WTO
case, the federal government may not have the political will to force a change in
Massachusetts law. Thus, the EU could retaliate against U.S. suppliers in its own
procurement further harming NFTC members. Second, even if Massachusetts
amended its law, either voluntarily or in response to a suit by the federal
government, the law would continue to apply to all procurements below the
GPA threshold of one-half million dollars (or the bulk of all procurements).
Third, the NFTC hoped for a broad constitutional ruling that would act as a
deterrent to all states from engaging in foreign policy-related sanctions, whereas
the WTO case could only act as a deterrent to GPA-covered states and only with
respect to procurement manifestations of sanctions laws.
B. Claims
The NFTC challenge was based on three constitutional claims:
preemption, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, and the dormant foreign
commerce clause. Prior to discussing the results of the court cases, some
background and context on these three types of claims is necessary.
1. Preemption
Preemption claims are based on Article VI of the U.S. constitution, that make
federal law supreme to state law, and an affirmative act by the U.S. federal
government. Preemption can occur in several different ways.
89 First, the federal
government can expressly preempt state activity in a field (termed “express”
preemption).
90 Second, preemption can be implied, either because federal
regulation in the field is so extensive (occupation of the field or simply field
preemption)
91 or because the federal interest in the area is dominant (dominant
federal interest preemption).
92 Third, preemption can arise because the state
measure conflicts with the federal act, either because it is physically impossible
to comply with both (direct conflict preemption) or because the state act stands
as an obstacle to the achievement of the full purposes of the federal act
(obstacles conflict preemption).
93
The NFTC could not base its preemption claim directly on the GPA.
Again, the Uruguay Round implementing act precludes private parties from
bringing claims in U.S. courts alleging the inconsistency of state laws with
WTO agreements.
94 Instead, the NFTC based its claim on the federal Burma
sanctions law.
Additionally, there are strong arguments that the federal government has
occupied the entire field of sanctions. In addition to federal laws sanctioning
individual countries, the Congress passed more generalized framework laws,16
most prominently the IEEPA,
95 delegating broad authority to the Executive to
impose sanctions. Combined with the President’s own powers in the foreign
affairs field and the Executive Branch’s constant monitoring of events and
diplomacy around the world, one could easily find preemption of three kinds:
field, dominant federal interest, and obstacles conflict (since the federal
government must be presumed to have properly calibrated the degree of
sanction, if any, taken against any given country).
2. Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
The Constitution does not grant a general foreign affairs power to the federal
government.
96 Instead, the Constitution allocates certain foreign affairs powers
to the federal branches and denies other such powers to the states. No one
questions that the federal government’s foreign affairs powers are plenary and
supreme. Further, the Supreme Court has declared on numerous occasions
throughout history that foreign affairs powers are “exclusive” to the federal
government.
97 A dormant doctrine flows necessarily from an exclusive power.
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In other words, even if the federal government does not act or utilize these
powers, i.e., the powers lie dormant, the states are prevented from taking actions
in the area. It was not until the 1969 Zschernig case that the so-called dormant
foreign affairs doctrine was utilized by the Supreme Court to strike down a state
action (specifically, the application of an Oregon escheat statute that state judges
utilized to criticize communist regimes).
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court appeared to establish a threshold effects
test for determining the validity of state actions under the doctrine, specifically
asking whether the state action has “more than some incidental or indirect”
effect on U.S. foreign relations or a foreign country.
99 However, there is some
evidence that the Court was concerned with the motive or purpose of the law as
well.
100 Lower courts relied on the Zschernig doctrine on several occasions over
the past several decades to invalidate state actions. Many of these lower courts,
while according due respect to the threshold effects test, nonetheless placed
considerable emphasis on the motive or purpose of the state action.
101 This is no
surprise because motive or purpose review, that would ask whether the primary
purpose of the state law is to change a foreign government’s policy, better suits
the competence of the courts and better ensures their role as independent arbitors
of constitutional questions. Courts recognize they have little ability to
independently gauge the impact of a particular state action on foreign relations.
Thus, under the threshold effects test, they turn to Executive Branch
submissions, foreign government amicus briefs and diplomatic protests, and
even the existence of disputes within international organizations such as the
WTO for indications of the impact of a state measure on foreign relations, all the
while denying such views are dispositive.17
More recently, revisionist scholars are questioning the continued viability
of the Zschernig doctrine and believe that today’s Supreme Court may be
receptive to their arguments given the revival of states’ rights by the Court in
general.
102 However, the two central foundations of this revisionist scholarship
are dubious.
103 The first claim of the revisionist scholars is that the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine is a relic of the Cold War.
104 In short, when our very
existence was at stake, we could not afford any intrusions by states and localities
into the foreign affairs field. However, the Cold War had a certain rationality (if
one will forgive the use of that term). The mere fact that consequences would be
draconian under “mutually assured destruction” meant neither side was likely to
overreact to a state or local measure. Today, foreign affairs are more
complicated. The adversaries are not always as clear and these adversaries have
many more quivers in their arrow, such as cyberwar and rumors to destabilize
financial markets, than the ultimate destructive act. The second claim of
revisionist scholars is that one of the central policies behind the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine, namely ensuring that the act of a one state does not lead to
retaliation against the nation as a whole, no longer holds since there are
instances in which nation’s have targeted retaliation against a particular sub-
national entity.
105 However, this argument ignores the possible forms of
retaliation, including hidden and subtle retaliation, the possibility of spill-over
effects even from so-called targeted retaliation, and other functional arguments
against state and local sanctions measures.
106 Moreover, other countries
understand that the federal government has the ability to control state actions in
the area and thus may direct retaliation against the state represented by the chair
of an important Congressional committee or a state important to an upcoming
Presidential election.
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3. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The Constitution allocates to the Congress the power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce.
108 However, for well over 150 years the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Commerce Clause to not only act as a grant of power to the
Congress, but also to act as a bar to state actions that discriminate against or
unduly interfere with foreign commerce even when Congress has not acted to
preempt the state measure, i.e. when the commerce power lies dormant. The
Court appears to apply a balancing test under the dormant Commerce Clause,
weighing the burden on commerce created by the state measure against its
achievement of a legitimate, non-protectionist local purpose. However, some
view this balancing that occurs on the face of opinions to simply be a way to
tease out a protectionist purpose.
109 In cases involving foreign commerce, the
Court applies the additional test of whether the state action “prevents the federal
government from speaking with one voice.”
110 This test as stated on one level18
makes little sense since a state measure can never really prevent the federal
government from speaking with “one voice” as the federal government could
preempt all state activity in the field. Instead, state activity can prevent the
federal government from speaking with a “quiet voice” or exercising quiet
diplomacy. The state action will force the federal government to be viewed as
either allowing or curbing the state action and thus force it to send some kind of
signal to the foreign government. In applying the test, the Court has stated the
real risk it seeks to prevent is retaliation against the United States as a whole for
actions by a state.
111 This concern, at least in part, also underlies the threshold
effects test of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and thus the additional prong
of analysis under the dormant foreign commerce clause (as courts often
recognize) ends up looking quite similar to the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine.
112
The other question that arises is whether something less than explicit
approval of the federal government can remove a state measure from scrutiny
under the dormant commerce clause. The Court has held that strongly inferred
toleration, e.g. specific consideration by the Congress of the state measure and a
rejection of preempting the state measure, can allow a state measure to clear the
“one voice” hurdle but not other portions of the dormant commerce clause
analysis. The Court has reasoned in such cases that “nothing requires the federal
government to speak with any particular voice.”
113 However, what many have
misunderstood, is that a simple failure to preempt does not constitute inferred
toleration. The Congress must specifically (and perhaps on numerous occasions)
turn its attention to and considered preemption of a particular state measure and
ultimately decided against preemption for the inferred toleration to arise.
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Massachusetts attempted to argue inferred toleration of their measure as a result
of the ban on private causes of action based on the GPA and the failure of the
federal Burma sanctions act to explicitly preempt the state sanctions law.
However, with respect to the GPA, it does preempt state laws but only the
federal government can bring such a case. The simple failure to explicitly
preempt the Massachusetts Burma law in the federal Burma sanctions law
cannot arise to inferred toleration because Congress did not turn sufficient
attention and consideration to the possibility of preemption and must be
assumed to know of the doctrines of implied and conflict preemption.
4. Market Participant Exception
One question that arises under both the dormant Commerce Clause and the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is whether these doctrines only apply to state
regulatory conduct or also apply when the state acts as a market participant, i.e.
a buyer or seller of goods. It is well-settled law that there is a market participant
doctrine to the dormant interstate Commerce Clause.
115 The market participant19
exception was created on several grounds. First, the text of the Commerce
Clause refers to the power to “regulate.”
116 Second, the state when acting as a
market participant can be analogized to a private actor in the market.
117 Third,
the budgetary expense of engaging in protectionist behavior when acting as a
buyer or seller reduces the risk to constitutional values protected by the dormant
Commerce Clause.
118 The Supreme Court has strongly hinted that the market
participant exception is available under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause
and most lower courts have followed this strong hint.
119 Indeed, it would be hard
to preserve the exception in the interstate context without allowing it in the
foreign commerce context. In today’s globalized economy a state action that
affects interstate commerce will in most instances also affect foreign commerce.
A state measure does not have to specifically target or discriminate against
foreign commerce in order to be subject to the dormant foreign commerce clause
constraints. Indeed, in the case in which the Supreme Court strongly hinted the
exception would apply, only 10% of the commerce affected by the state measure
was foreign trade.
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Much less certain is whether the market participant exception applies to
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. While a Maryland state court examining
that state’s South Africa sanctions in the mid-1980’s found the exception was
available, the justifications for the exception appear not to apply in the context
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. First, the textual basis disappears. The
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is implied not from a particular clause granting
the federal government power to “regulate” a particular matter but rather an
amalgam of clauses and the structure of the Constitution relating to foreign
affairs. Second, the analogy to the private actor does not hold. The Supreme
Court, in a discussion of surrounding federal preemption of a state procurement
law sanctioning labor law violators, found that “government occupies a unique
position of power in our international society, and its conduct, regardless of
form, is rightly subject to special restraints” and “in our system, states are
simply different from private parties and have a different role to play.”
121 Third,
procurement sanctions for foreign policy purposes are likely to be significantly
less expensive in budgetary terms than procurement preferences for protectionist
reasons.
Additionally, the market participant exception does not apply when a
state’s action has a regulatory effect on conduct in a downstream or upstream
market in which it is not a direct participant. For example, the state of Alaska
did not qualify for the market participant exception when they included in their
contracts selling raw logs from state lands a condition that processing of the logs
be done within the state.
122 Since the Massachusetts Burma law has a regulatory
effect on its suppliers relationships with Burma, the market participant
exception, even if theoretically available, should not apply.20
C. Results In Federal Court
1. Federal District Court
The federal district court struck down the Massachusetts law on the basis of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine in November of 1998,
123 leading to the EU and
Japan suspending their WTO complaint a few months later. With respect to the
other two claims by the NFTC, the district court found they had failed to carry
the burden of proof with respect to preemption and that it was not necessary to
rule on the dormant foreign Commerce Clause claim.
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In reaching its conclusion on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine claim,
the court applied the threshold effects test most evident in the Zschernig
opinion. Specifically, the Court asked, quoting the Zschernig case, whether the
law had “more than some indirect or incidental effect, in foreign countries” or a
“great potential for disruption or embarrassment.”
125 Nonetheless, the federal
district court first engaged in motive review, as most lower courts have done in
applying the Zschernig test. The court highlighted that the only purpose of the
Massachusetts Burma law was to sanction Burma for its human rights violations
and to change these practices.
126 After engaging in motive review, the court
returned to applying the threshold effects test. One of the factors the court
looked to in determining whether the law violated the threshold effects test was
the concerns the EU and Japan raised in the WTO.
127 Thus, the mere existence
of the WTO dispute (irrespective of any finding of a WTO violation) had a
minimal influence on the constitutional finding of a violation of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. While the threshold effects test allows some minimal
interplay in this regard, it should be kept in proper context. The holding of the
federal district court would have been the same even if Massachusetts had never
agreed to become bound to the GPA such that the EU and Japan could never
have raised WTO compliance issues with the United States with respect to the
Massachusetts law. Nevertheless, a motive review test under the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine better respects the nature of international agreements,
such as the WTO, that cannot be directly invoked in a U.S. court by a private
party.
2. First Circuit Court of Appeals
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling but
expanded the basis of the ruling to all three doctrines: preemption, dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, and dormant foreign Commerce Clause.
128 The First
Circuit began its dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis by applying the
Zschernig test. However, like the district court, the initial factor the First Circuit
cited in drawing its conclusion that the law had more than some incidental effect21
on foreign relations was that the “design and intent of the law is to affect the
affairs of a foreign country.”
129 As did the district court, the First Circuit
proceeded to consider the protests of foreign countries to the law. Although it
did not mentioned specifically the presence of the WTO dispute in this context,
it is clear from the opinion the court was aware of the proceedings. However, the
First Circuit relied on the numerous other forms of protest to the law outside the
WTO. For example, the EU lodged diplomatic protests with the State
Department and filed an amicus brief in the case.
130 The grounds for the protest
went beyond alleged WTO-inconsistency of the Massachusetts Burma law to
include its extraterritorial regulatory effect. Thus, the WTO dispute played some
role, but clearly a non-essential one, in the First Circuit’s ruling on the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine claim. The U.S. Executive Branch, as it did before the
district court, declined to file an amicus brief in opposition to the state law, to
the chagrin of many in the business community.
The First Circuit also invalidated the law under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause for three reasons. First, it found that the statute facially
discriminated against foreign commerce, even though it applied equally to
foreign and domestic companies, because it attempted to regulate both sets of
companies in their dealings with Burma.
131 Second, the court found that the law
violated the additional prong of analysis in foreign Commerce Clause cases, the
“one voice” test, stating that this test was similar to, but distinct from the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
132 Third, the court found that the state law
essentially attempted to regulate conduct outside its territory, namely
companies’ dealings with Burma.
133 Previous Commerce Clause decisions found
that states were precluded from regulating commerce that takes place wholly
outside of the state’s borders, regardless of whether the commerce has effects
within the state, and that the critical inquiry was whether the practical effect of
the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the state.
134 The
court refused to find “inferred toleration” of the bill by the failure to explicitly
preempt the state law in the federal Burma sanctions law. The court found that a
much higher degree of “clarity and frequency of the refusal of Congress to act”
to preempt is required to find inferred toleration.
135 In any event, inferred
toleration of Congress would only save the law under the “one voice” portion of
the dormant foreign Commerce Clause doctrine (i.e., it does not save laws that
have been found unconstitutional under that doctrine for other reasons, such as
facial discrimination against foreign commerce or extraterritorial regulatory
effect).
136
Finally, the First Circuit found that the Massachusetts Burma law was
preempted by the federal sanctions on Burma. It highlighted that preemption is
more readily implied in the foreign affairs field and that the state law “veered
from the carefully balanced path that Congress constructed” by “imposing22
distinct restrictions different in scope and kind from the federal law.”
137 For
example, the federal law (combined with the Executive Order) only prohibited
new investment by U.S. companies whereas the Massachusetts law sought to
terminate existing investment by both U.S. and foreign companies through the
leverage of the state’s procurement market.
3. U.S. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court unanimously (9-0) affirmed the First Circuit’s decision but
only on the grounds of preemption.
138 The Court found that the Massachusetts
law stood as an obstacle to the achievement of the full purposes of the federal
sanctions law, essentially basing its ruling on “obstacles conflict” preemption.
The Court held that the Massachusetts law “undermines the intended purposes
and natural effect of at least three provisions of the federal act, that is its
delegation of effective discretion to the President to control economic sanctions
against Burma, its limitations of sanctions solely to United States persons and
new investment, and its directive to the President to proceed diplomatically in
developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy towards Burma.”
139 It
explicitly declined to consider a broader sense of preemption, namely “field
preemption” (i.e. that the entire field of economic sanctions against foreign
countries was occupied by the federal government).
140 The Court also found it
unnecessary to address the dormant foreign Commerce Clause and dormant
foreign affairs doctrine claims.
141
The WTO dispute settlement proceedings played a very small, non-
dispositive role in the Court’s analysis, even though preemption was not based
on the WTO agreements and the Court did not even undertake dormant-type
analysis. The Court only mentioned the WTO case in its obstacles conflict
preemption analysis with respect to one of the three relevant provisions in the
federal act, namely the Congressional directive to the President to proceed
diplomatically in developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy towards
Burma.
142 But the analysis regarding this provision of federal law also
mentioned the formal diplomatic protests filed by the EU and Executive Branch
statements indicating that the Massachusetts law was complicating efforts to
build coalitions with allies with respect to Burma.
143 Moreover, the Court had
already found as a matter of logic that the state law was a threat to the
President’s diplomatic efforts.
144
As it did before the lower courts, Massachusetts argued that the Court
should ignore the evidence of a WTO dispute because of the ban on private
causes of action within the Uruguay Round legislation. Massachusetts argued
that acknowledging evidence of the dispute effectively violated the ban on
private causes of action. However, the Supreme Court rejected the argument23
because the claim in this case was preemption based on the federal Burma
sanctions and not on the basis of the GPA.
145 The Court also rejected for the
same reason Massachusetts’ argument that the ban on private causes of action
plus the federal government’s decision to decline to bring its own suit on the
basis of the GPA was evidence of inferred toleration.
146 Lastly, the court
rejected the argument that failure to expressly to preempt the state law in the
federal Burma sanctions law constituted implicit permission. The Court stated
that a “failure to provide for preemption expressly may reflect nothing more
than the settled character of implied preemption doctrine that courts will
dependably apply…”
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Unlike the case before the lower courts, the U.S. Executive Branch did
submit an amicus brief to the Court asking that it declare the Massachusetts law
unconstitutional on all three grounds.
148 Indeed, the list of amici in opposition to
the law included six U.S. Senators, fourteen representatives, a host of business
and agricultural groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and the American
Farm Bureau, and a group of former government officials, featuring former
President Gerry Ford and several former Secretaries of States, U.S. Attorney-
Generals, and U.S. Trade Representatives. However, the number of amici
supporting the Massachusetts law was also extremely large, including four U.S.
Senators, roughly sixty U.S. representatives, 22 states, 16 municipalities,
numerous state and municipal organizations, and numerous NGOs, such as
Human Rights Watch and the Sierra Club.
D. The Future of U.S. Sub-Federal Procurement Sanctions Laws
The proliferation of state sanction laws seems to have subsided somewhat with
the Supreme Court’s ruling against the Massachusetts Burma law. Indeed,
proposals in numerous state legislatures, including California, Connecticut, New
York, North Carolina, and Texas, to enact parallel laws died in committees or
were otherwise abandoned even as the NFTC case worked its way through the
lower courts.
149 However, any re-emergence of these laws or continued
enforcement of laws similar to the Massachusetts Burma law will lead to further
EU-US tensions. Thus, it is critical how state legislators and officials read the
Supreme Court’s opinion.
Many proponents of state sanctions laws are referring to the Supreme
Court’s opinion as narrow and maintain they have considerable flexibility to
adopt sanctions laws in the future.
150 For example, the deputy executive director
of the NCSL has stated that the “narrow decision leave as many questions as
answers on the appropriate role for states and localities in foreign affairs.”
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The opinion has been referred to as narrow because the Supreme Court scaled
back the grounds for invalidating the state law from those relied upon by the24
First Circuit. The First Circuit opinion was comprehensive and, it should be
remembered by Massachusetts officials and other state officials in the First
Circuit, that its rulings on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause, remain “good law” in that Circuit. Additionally, it is
not unusual for the Supreme Court to limit its opinions to the most narrow
grounds and it was unanimous in ruling the Massachusetts law unconstitutional.
More importantly, its opinion, properly read, leaves little to no room for state
foreign policy-related sanctions measures.
Most federal sanctions laws, whether general or specific to a particular
country or group of countries, contain features identical or similar to those found
in the federal Burma sanctions act. First, most federal sanction statutes give the
President discretion to control economic sanctions and, in fact, the sanctions
reform effort of the past several years (that has not been wholly successful as of
yet) highlighted the need to give the President “waiver” authority with respect to
sanctions. Even where an individual sanctions act does not include waiver
authority, one can argue Congress has set the exact level of sanction it desires.
Moreover, in nearly all instances, a more generalized statute (e.g., IEEPA
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will be available to impose additional sanctions against the country and, in this
sense, the President has discretion to control the level of sanctions. Second, in
the case of any individual country, the Congress together with the President will
have calibrated a particularly level of sanction, the types of persons affected and
the types of trade and investment covered, and so forth. State and local sanctions
almost by necessity will change what must be assumed to be the careful
calibration of sanctions. In the Burma case, federal sanctions were limited to
U.S. companies and to new investment. The Massachusetts law affected foreign
companies and existing investment. Third, state and local sanctions will
typically undermine the President’s capacity to engage in effective diplomacy.
While the federal Burma sanctions act gave a Congressional directive to the
President to develop a “comprehensive, multilateral strategy” with regard to
Burma, the Court highlighted the President’s own powers in foreign affairs field
as well. Thus, an express command by Congress in a particular instance is not
essential to finding state sanctions laws an obstacle to Presidential diplomacy.
Finally, there is nothing in the Supreme Court opinion to suggest that state
foreign policy-related procurement sanctions laws would survive scrutiny under
the dormant foreign Commerce Clause or the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
even in cases in which the Court is unwilling or unable to find preemption. The
dormant foreign Commerce Clause is well-established law and the market
participant exception, while available for “Buy American” or protectionist
procurement laws, will not apply to foreign policy-related sanctions laws that
mirror the Massachusetts Burma law, i.e., that constitute secondary boycotts.
The dormant foreign affairs doctrine, while under increasing academic25
criticism,
153 has never been rejected by the Supreme Court. In fact, the Court did
consider a claim under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine subsequent to
Zschernig, and implicitly admitted the continuing vitality of the doctrine,
although it ultimately rejected the claim because the state measure had
“insignificant international consequences.”
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VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR EU-US DISPUTE PREVENTION AND
RESOLUTION
A. Dispute Prevention
1. Enhancing State Legislators and Governors Fealty to their Constitutional
Oath
Conscientious state legislators and governors will apply constitutional
constraints as they develop and vote on (or consider signing, in the case of
governors) legislation.
155 Indeed, state legislators and governors are required to
apply these constraints and not simply leave the application of such constraints
to the courts should the measure be challenged after its enactment. The U.S.
Constitution requires that all state legislators take oaths or affirmations to
uphold the federal Constitution.
156 When applying these constraints, a state
legislator is not allowed to arrive at his or her own interpretation of the
Constitution. Instead, a state legislator is bound to follow or, at the very least,
give substantial deference to, U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Thus, state
legislators and governors should apply the doctrines of preemption, dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, and dormant Commerce Clause prior to passing or
signing legislation. The incorporation of these considerations into initiation
programs for new legislators, and training programs for counsel to the
legislature and governor, may encourage legislators and governors to act in a
conscientious fashion.
Importantly, state legislators and governors, as part of their preemption
analysis, should be asking whether the laws they craft are in conformity with
trade agreements, including the WTO. The fact that the implementing acts for
the WTO agreements only allow the federal Executive but not private parties to
bring suits against the states based on non-compliance with the agreements, a
mechanism described as “weak preemption,”
157 does not eliminate this duty. The
conscientious legislator and governor must apply these constraints and not
simply think in a tactical fashion by merely assessing the possibility of suit by
the federal Executive, an act that may be politically difficult.
158 There is some
recent anecdotal evidence that state officials are increasingly considering trade
agreement constraints as they consider proposed legislation. For example, Ohio
state senators introducing legislation to stiffen penalties for violation of state law26
requiring the use of domestically-produced steel in public works projects
requested that the Ohio Legislative Service Commission prepare an analysis of
the consistency of the bill with the GPA.
2. Enhanced and Regularized USTR/State Department Outreach
Since a significant number of state officials still lack awareness and familiarity
with constitutional and international agreement constraints on their actions, or
fail to give sufficient consideration to these constraints, it is important for the
federal government to maintain a proactive outreach effort to both educate and
cajol state officials.
159 Indeed, awareness needs to be raised not just with respect
to legal constraints but also non-binding political constraints, such as the EU-US
Summit agreement with respect to extraterritorial sanctions.
The outreach effort primarily should be the responsibility of the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the U.S. State Department.
This outreach effort can begin through the national associations of state and
local elected officials, such as the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), the National Governors’ Association (NGA), and the National
Conference of Mayors. However, it should extend to the grassroots level with
links to individual state legislatures and governors offices. These outreach
efforts should be regularized. The outreach efforts can extend to not only
educating states on constraints on their activities but also elaborating on the
federal efforts that are being made to resolve foreign policy problems that are of
concern at the grassroots level. For instance, when asked why Massachusetts did
not limit itself to simply passing a non-binding resolution on Burma,
Representative Rushing stated responded that “for years we passed resolutions
on a lot of international issues, and we never even once got a letter back from
the State Department. That’s why we pass selective purchasing bills, because
that gets (the federal government’s) attention.”
Even on a limited, ad hoc basis, prior outreach efforts have shown
positive results. For example, shortly after the EU raised concerns over the
Massachusetts Burma law, USTR officials met with the NGA to urge states to
consult with the USTR before considering sanctions legislation.
160 However, it
appears that such consultations were only to focus on having state foreign
policy-related sanctions proposals conform to the GPA, rather than the
constitutionality and wisdom of such laws.
161 Nevertheless, federal government
consultations with the states did prevent sanctions legislation from being passed
in some states (e.g., sanctions against Nigeria being considered by the Maryland
legislature).
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3. Experiment with the Inclusion of State Legislators and/or Governors in
Meetings of the EU-US Summit and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
To further invest state officials in the process, and to further hammer home the
complications of unilateral foreign policy-related sanctions by the states, the EU
and U.S. federal government could experiment with including a representative
of the state legislators and a representative of the governors (e.g. the lead
legislator and lead governor on trade issues in their respective national
associations) in meetings connected with the EU-US Summit. This would
include meetings of EU-US trade officials as well as the TransAtlantic Business
Dialogue (and perhaps the other dialogues too). Presumably, the lead state
legislator and governor will be better equipped and motivated to stem the tide of
state foreign policy-related sanctions through their leadership positions in their
national associations after attending the Summit meetings.
4. Continuous and Active Monitoring and Lobbying by Businesses
One of the reasons cited by commentators for Governor Weld’s shift in position
on the Burma sanctions law was the lack of strong, active business opposition to
the law. Indeed, a group of businesses under the organizational heading
USAEngage that has lead the sanctions reform lobbying effort, admitted that the
business community failed to realize in time the growing proliferation of state
and local foreign policy-related sanctions laws.
163 It is clear that the internet
increased the ability of NGOs and human rights activists to lobby multiple
jurisdictions throughout the country and the world even with limited resources.
The business community cannot cede the field to such groups and must
highlighted the limited effectiveness and costs of unilateral sanctions,
particularly at the state and local level. However, the business community must
not find itself simply in an antagonistic relationship with the NGOs, if for no
other reason that consumer boycotts against particular companies can also be
organized. Instead, the business community must show some outreach and
responsiveness to the concerns of these organizations without ceding principles
of importance. Industry wide and/or individual corporate codes of conduct may
be one means to address concerns of NGOs.
B. Dispute Resolution
1. Avoid Use of WTO Dispute Settlement Panels to Challenge State Foreign
Policy-Related Procurement Sanctions Laws
The use of WTO dispute settlement is likely to be ineffective in stopping state
foreign policy-related procurement sanctions laws. GPA obligations only apply
to thirty-seven states and only for contracts on goods and services above28
$5000,000. Thus, even a successful WTO complaint would only partially cure
the problem of state procurement sanctions legislation enacted for foreign
policy-reasons (and this assumes the state would amend its measure or the
federal government would sue the state to come into compliance with the
ruling). Given that future international trade negotiations need to further
constrain state behavior in areas such as procurement and trade-in-services, it is
probably wise to avoid unnecessarily raising the ire of state officials with a
WTO dispute settlement case. This is particularly true when a constitutional
claim in domestic courts will be more effective at eliminating state procurement
sanctions enacted for foreign policy reasons, as well as other manifestations of
state foreign policy-related sanctions.
164 It is true, however, that the existence of
a WTO dispute can minimally influence a domestic constitutional claim. But, at
most, this supports proceeding with WTO consultations and does not require
proceeding with a dispute settlement panel.
2. Litigation in Domestic Courts Provides A More Effective & Comprehensive
Constraint on State Foreign Policy-Related Procurement Sanctions Laws
As seen in the case of the Massachusetts Burma law, domestic litigation is likely
to be quite successful in challenging state procurement sanctions laws enacted
for foreign policy purposes. The real problem is finding a plaintiff to bring the
cases. Businesses had traditionally been hesitant to challenge such laws fearing
they would create consumer backlashes or boycotts. Indeed, in the South Africa
sanctions era the only case was brought against a divestment measure by the city
of Baltimore, Maryland. Businesses were finally able to overcome this fear by
acting collectively in the form of an organization, the National Foreign Trade
Council, in the Massachusetts Burma case. However, if state officials misread
the Supreme Court’s decision, then a proliferation of state sanctions measures
could occur again. Affected businesses will have to be ready and must continue
to act collectively to bring future challenges in such instances.
Amicus briefs by the Executive Branch opposing such laws will be taken
into account by courts in such cases. Thus, it will be important for the Executive
Branch to take the sometimes politically difficult position of opposing these
state laws. Democratic Administrations often share close links to human rights
and environmental organizations that support such laws. However, they must
make the honest case that these goals are damaged by divergent state and local
measures that distract other countries attention away from the problem country
and towards the sanctions. Republican Administrations often are strong
protectors of states rights. However, they must make the honest case that the
field of foreign affairs is not like other fields in the constitutional division of
powers.29
Similarly, amicus briefs and diplomatic protests by foreign governments
have some influence in these cases. As long as U.S. courts continue to apply a
threshold effects test under Zschernig, and even as courts engage in obstacles
conflict preemption analysis, foreign governments can benefit their cause by
submitting amicus briefs. Thus, business lobbying of, and coordination with, the
Executive Branch and foreign governments in such cases can be helpful.
C. Looking Beyond State Procurement Sanctions Laws to Other State
Foreign Policy-Related Sanctions and Protectionist Behavior Potentially
Causing EU-US Frictions
1. Other Sanctions Measures
Prior to the Massachusetts Burma case, procurement sanctions had become the
preferred mode of foreign policy-related sanctions for state and local
governments. It is viewed by many state and local officials as the most effective
mode given the tremendous buying power of state and local governments. The
procurement mode of sanction was apparently first introduced in the era of
South Africa sanctions in 1985 by the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
However, the predominant sanction in the era of South Africa sanctions was
divestment measures, e.g. prohibitions on the state pension funds being used for
investments in companies active in South Africa. Some state officials are
suggesting a return to divestment measures in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision concerning the Massachusetts Burma law. Other recent sanctions
measures focus on the elimination of so-called “sweatshops” and seeking
reparations for past human rights violations. Domestic constitutional challenges
to these types of sanctions measures are explored below.
a. Divestment
State and local divestment measures concerning South Africa arose from state
legislatures, governors actions, pension-fund investment board actions, and even
citizen initiatives. In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Massachusetts
Burma case, the U.S. Executive Branch suggested that divestment measures
might survive constitutional scrutiny without taking any formal position on the
issue.
165 The brief argues that divestment statutes would not have as “direct a
regulatory effect” as the Massachusetts Burma law.
166 The discussion in the
brief is certainly one factor state proponents of sanctions will take into account
as they determine what, if any, measures to take in response to human rights
concerns in foreign countries. Indeed, the discussion in the brief is regrettable
because it was unnecessary to the case at hand and proponents of state sanctions
legislation are likely to read it with “rose colored glasses.” Indeed, the Executive
Branch appears in its brief to be uncomfortable to some degree with leaving the30
door open with respect to divestment statutes. For example, the brief states that
“even if the Court were to hold that States have the latitude under the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause to adopt a policy of mandatory divestment from
companies doing business in another country, it would not necessarily follow
that states would have the same latitude to adopt a policy of mandatory
divestment from companies doing business in another State.”
167 The brief makes
this qualification even though the Supreme Court has indicated that measures
affecting foreign commerce are to receive stricter scrutiny than those affecting
interstate commerce.
168
The constitutionality of a state divestment measure was only addressed in
one case in the era of South Africa sanctions. In 1988, the Maryland Court of
Appeals (the highest state court in Maryland) upheld the divestment ordinance
of the City of Baltimore, rejecting challenges on the grounds of preemption,
dormant foreign affairs doctrine and dormant Commerce Clause.
169 However,
the court’s analysis can be criticized on several grounds. First, the court did not
give sufficient attention to all the possible bases of preemption, including
obstacles conflict, dominant federal interest, and field. Second, the court found
that the market participant exception applied to the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. As noted previously, the rationales for the exception have little force in
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine context. It also found that the city measure
had little impact on the South African government but it did not take sufficient
account of the cumulative effect of state and local ordinances. It also failed to
take account of the impact on relations between the U.S. and other countries
seeking change in South Africa. Moreover, in the Massachusetts Burma law
case, the First Circuit hinted that it would have ruled differently than the




Another mode of sanction that states and localities are considering in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision, is to focus procurement sanctions against those
companies “benefiting” from human rights or labor rights violations. For
example, the New York City Council considered a measure that would prohibit
the city from buying uniforms from apparel companies that pay wages below a
“non-poverty” level in foreign countries.
171 The ordinance was drafted and
promoted by the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees
(UNITE).
172 Although the measure does not target a specific country (or
companies operating in a specific country), the measure may still be subject to
successful challenge on preemption, dormant foreign affairs and dormant
foreign commerce clause grounds.31
c. Allowing Claims/Seeking Reparations for Prior Human Rights Violations
California passed a law in 1999 allowing WWII prisoner’s of war to file suit in
California courts against companies that used them as forced labor or that are
affiliated with such companies.
173 While originally targeted at Germany, an
agreement between the United States and Germany led to the establishment of a
settlement fund for claims against German companies. Instead, claims are being
filed largely against Japanese companies and affiliates. A federal district judge
has ruled that such suits are preempted by the allies Peace Treaty with Japan, at
least with respect to POWs from the 48 allied countries signing the treaty.
174
Subsequently, a federal district court judge ruled that claims by POWs from
non-allied countries could not be allowed because the statute violated the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
175
In 1999, California also passed the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
that requires insurers that do business in California and that sold policies in
Europe during the Holocaust-era to report information concerning those policies
and the payment of benefits to the state insurance commissioner.
176 The
reporting requirement also applies to insurance companies that do business in
California and are “related” to a company that sold-Holocaust era policies.
177
Two foreign insurance companies challenged this reporting statute in federal
court.
178 Two other related laws were also originally challenged but standing
problems lead to review of those laws being dropped. These laws allow
California residents to bring claims for the payment of Holocaust-era insurance
policies (extending the statute of limitations to 2010) and require the state
insurance commissioner to suspend the certificate of authority of any insurer to
has failed to pay on valid Holocaust-era policies.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the federal district court
ruling issuing a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the reporting
law.
179 The Ninth Circuit found that the law did not have extraterritorial reach
and thus it fell within Congress express delegation to the states to regulate the
business of insurance.
180 The Court also rejected the “one voice” additional
prong of the dormant foreign commerce clause challenge because Congressional
approval of the state reporting measure could at the very least be inferred from
the federal Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998.
181 In that act, the
Congress established a commission to “conduct a thorough study and develop a
historical record of” Holocaust-era assets in the United States, and directs the
commission to take note of the work of the national association of (state)
insurance commissioners with regard to Holocaust-era insurance policies.
182 The
Court surmised that Congress must have expected that the insurance
commissioners would be acting pursuant to state law, and that foreign affiliates
of domestic insurance companies might be required to search records in order32
for the objectives of the federal act to be met.
183 The Ninth Circuit took a narrow
view of the Zcshernig doctine, finding it inapplicable where a state law mainly
involved foreign commerce and was not targeted at a particular country.
184 In
spite of the ruling, it is important to keep in mind a different result may be
reached in a case involving not just the reporting requirement but also the other
laws dealing with claims for payments or suspension of a license.
d. Non-Binding Resolutions
One option that is being considered by advocates of state and local sanctions is
to simply rely on non-binding resolutions to highlight issues and urge the U.S.
federal government to take stronger action on a particular foreign policy matter.
It is important for state and local officials to be able to communicate their views
on federal issues raising local concerns to federal government officials. Indeed,
this is in part why state and local officials form national associations based in
Washington, D.C.
There seems little harm in most cases of state and local governments
expressing their views on foreign policy issues in non-binding resolutions. Such
resolutions can potentially survive either threshold effects or motive/purpose
review under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. There is also a longer
historical practice of such resolutions by states and localities. Indeed, during oral
argument in the Massachusetts Burma case, Justice Souter, the author of the
Supreme Court opinion, suggested that “perhaps the proper way to draw the line
is to allow states to express themselves, to express their views… so long as they
do not go beyond the point of verbalizing…”. The U.S. Executive Branch
amicus brief also stated that non-binding resolutions “condemning the conduct
of a repressive foreign regime” or “petition(ing) Congress and the President to
take action against the regime” would be constitutionally permitted.
185 In any
event, in contrast to sanctions measures, non-binding or “sense of” resolutions
are unlikely to cause significant friction in EU-US relations.
2. Protectionist State Legislation
Formal EU-US disputes over protectionist-motivated, as opposed to foreign
policy-motivated, state and local legislation are likely to be rare for the
foreseeable future. In the area of procurement, no state agreed to be bound in a
manner that would require a change or liberalization of current procurement
regimes. In essence, the EU achieved a standstill against new protectionism in
state procurement done by certain entities within thirty-seven states with respect
to contracts above one-half million dollars for goods and services. The other
thirteen states maintain complete flexibility to enact new protectionist
legislation. Indeed, at least two states, West Virginia and Ohio, have recently33
considered adopting preferences for domestically-produced steel (or
strengthening penalites against the use of foreign-made steel) in public works
projects.
186 The Massachusetts Burma case has raised awareness of the GPA
among state officials. Thus, both West Virginia and Ohio made sure through
research and contact with the office of the USTR that their proposed measures
did not violate the GPA (neither state is bound to the GPA).
187 Thus, it is likely
that disputes under the WTO for state violations of the GPA will remain rare.
Additionally, complaints over “buy-american” or “buy-in-state” provisions in
state procurement laws are unlikely to find their way into domestic courts. These
protectionist procurement laws have in the past, and are likely to continue to,
survive any domestic constitutional challenges. Instead, state procurement
preferences will continue to cause frictions mainly at the negotiating table as the
EU seeks greater coverage of state and local procurement. However, should a
state enact a protectionist procurement measure applicable to contracts above the
GPA threshold, WTO dispute settlement will provide the best means to resolve
the dispute since domestic litigation by private parties is unlikely to be
successful.
States are also unlikely to violate other WTO agreements. For example,
the GATS agreement creates only a “standstill” obligation against new
protectionist measures
188 and states seem not to be pursuing new protectionism
in this area. Thus, in the near term, disputes over state measures affecting trade-
in-services are likely to occur primarily within the confines of WTO
negotiations for further services liberalization.
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